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
August 24, 1956

MEMORANDUM TO HEADS OF DEPARTMENT AGENCIES

Operation Alert 1956


Herewith for your information and use in further defense planning is a copy of the final report to the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, on participation of the USDA in Operation Alert 1956.

The cooperation of all who took part in the exercise is very much appreciated. Although the exercise was recognized as representing a considerable improvement over a year ago, I am sure we all noted areas where substantial clarification of policy and procedures is needed. It is important now that we continue to move forward with consistent purpose to strengthen our defense readiness, giving special emphasis to the areas in particular need of improvement.



True D. Morse  
Acting Secretary

Attachments 1, 2 and 3 previously  
distributed to all agencies  
Attachments 4, 5, 6 and 7 herewith





List of Attachments

1. "Participation of U.S. Department of Agriculture in Operation Alert 1956" (OP Alert 56 - No. 1, USDA memo. June 19, 1956)
2. "Conduct of the Exercise at Repoint," and related forms (OP Alert 56 - No. 2, USDA memo. July 17, 1956)
3. "Field Coordination of Defense Mobilization and Civil Defense Activities" (Department Memorandum No. 1398 and Supplement 1, thereto, June 13, 1956)
4. "Administrative Preparation for Operation Alert 1956" (Under Secretary memo. of July 11, 1956, to USDA Regional Liaison Representatives)
5. "Summary of Simulated Program Actions by USDA During Operation Alert 1956 - Food Activities"
6. "Summary of Simulated Program Actions by USDA During Operation Alert 1956 - General Functional Areas"
7. "Summary of Simulated Program Actions by USDA During Operation Alert 1956 - Regional Liaison Representatives and Participating USDA Agencies in Field Areas"

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Report of Participation in Operation Alert 1956

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Final Report on Participation in Operation Alert 1956

July 20 - 25, 1956

PART I

SUMMARY EVALUATION AND COMMENTS

This final report on participation of the U. S. Department of Agriculture in Operation Alert 1956 is prepared in response to ODM memorandum of July 2, 1956.

Generally, all actions at the relocation headquarters, "Repoint," except a few which related to current program activity, were undertaken with Operation Alert 1956 assumptions in mind. The exercise progressed smoothly, and contributed substantially to the ability of the Department to carry out its various delegated responsibilities. Less improvisation was necessary this year and the USDA is in a better position to cope with an emergency of the type assumed by the exercise than it was a year ago. However, as demonstrated by the exercise, there is a need for the clarification of certain delegations and the refinement of interagency working relationships. These matters will be discussed in this report under the related subject-matter headings.

A. Organization and direction of the exercise

1. Officials in charge at National Relocation Center - Repoint.

Mr. True D. Morse, Acting Secretary, 4:30 p.m., July 20 to 10:30 a.m., July 22

Mr. Marvin L. McLain, Assistant Secretary, 1:30 p.m., July 22 to 4 p.m., July 25

Mr. Ralph S. Roberts, Administrative Assistant Secretary, 10:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m., July 22. Mr. Roberts was on duty during the entire period of the exercise beginning from 4:30 p.m., July 20.

The Relocation Center was activated immediately upon notification of the Alert at 11:00 a.m., EDT, July 20, by a pre-test exercise cadre of nineteen Department personnel. Two persons are permanently headquartered at the location for emergency activation in the event of need.

2. Organization. The USDA was organized to test readiness to meet Operation Alert 1956 emergency conditions at both the National and field levels. In addition to the USDA National Relocation Center - Repoint - eleven primary field liaison and communication centers were activated. 278 Department employees and 8 representatives of other agencies were on duty at Repoint and 234 Department personnel participated in the exercise at field locations.

(a) Repoint organization. The exercise was carried out by a simulated emergency organization comprised of two major groupings of activities, e.g., (1) all essential wartime functions relating directly to food production and supply management, and (2) all essential supporting agricultural functions.

Policy formulation and key decision making was the function of an "Executive Committee," composed of the principal program (major organization) heads, which met twice daily under the direction of the senior official in charge.

The over-all framework for USDA participation in and the conduct of Operation Alert 1956 is outlined in memorandums of June 19 and July 17 signed by the Administrative Assistant Secretary (attachments 1 and 2).

(b) Field organization. Field coordination of defense mobilization and civil defense activities was effected through eight Regional Liaison Representatives. These representatives were strategically located in respect to (a) primary agricultural areas to be served, (b) accessibility to ODM and FCDA regional representatives, (c) effectiveness of communications, and (d) other factors, including distance and direction from primary target areas.

Operations during the exercise indicated that it would greatly facilitate the coordination and direction of related programs if the ODM and FCDA regional headquarters were at the same location and, particularly, if the regional organization boundaries of the two agencies could be made the same.

In addition to the eight major area locations, three secondary stations were activated to serve important agricultural needs. They are alternate stations concerned with particular agricultural programs which cooperate on specific matters with the USDA Regional Liaison Representative in whose area they are located, respectively. Through the eight major sites a number of the regular field offices were brought into the exercise on a limited participation basis.

Memorandum No. 1398 and Supplement 1 provide further information respecting the organization and direction of "defense" activities (attachment 3). Also a memorandum from the Under Secretary dated July 11 is informative on this subject (attachment 4).

3. Adequacy of staffing. The scope of Operation Alert 1956 and the advance staffing pattern indicated the need during a part of the exercise for additional staff in a few areas. As a consequence some program specialists, in particular, were required to work inordinately long hours. The National Relocation Center was continued in operation on a 24-hour basis throughout the exercise although a somewhat smaller staff was on duty during the night after 10:00 p.m. However, the principal official in charge and staff specialists were immediately available on call at all times to handle any urgent matters. Some temporary deficiencies were experienced in the availability of secretarial assistance and in the staffing of administrative services.

4. Suitability of staff facilities - Repoint. The local facilities at the National Relocation Center were excellent for officing, lodging, and feeding all personnel participating in the exercise. Such facilities are believed adequate to serve the staff which might be needed at this location during an actual emergency situation. However, only relatively limited public transportation serves the location, which could present some problems in particular circumstances.

5. Effectiveness of communications. Summary of message volume handled:

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Agnet</u>	<u>ICS</u>	<u>Unclassified</u>	<u>Classified</u>
Number incoming	1758	977	781	1746	12
Number outgoing	1669	1346	323	1659	10

The average length of messages originated at Repoint over the ICS network was 174 words and over Agnet was 124 words, which were somewhat longer than average normal communications traffic.

The communications system capability and staffing at Repoint were adequate to service Operation Alert 1956. Procedures were significantly improved over a year ago. All messages were dispatched with reasonable promptness. Many delays were experienced, however, in the timely delivery of messages over the ICS network and the Agnet using GSA transmission facilities. The most notable instance was in reference to message AB35 (250300Z), Summary Evaluation Report, which was rerun several times on request of Highpoint. Perhaps some delays were caused by the communications system being overloaded with material prepared prior to the exercise. If most of such material could have been sent to all agencies concerned prior to the exercise the communications systems would have been more available for the transmission of urgent messages.

In general, it appeared that the greatest difficulty in communications was a physical one at Highpoint and at GSA relay centers throughout the field. During the early part of the exercise the USDA representatives at Lowpoint experienced a considerable problem in receiving messages relating to USDA responsibilities. This may have been due in part to the lack of a mutual understanding between FCDA and USDA respecting the manner in which USDA functions are to be carried out. This question is in urgent need of clarification. The National Security Agency furnished cryptographic

equipment for encoding and decoding all classified messages. USDA personnel were trained in military communications procedure which was used on the interagency network and also in the operation of the cryptographic equipment.

6. Reports. It is recommended that no summary or evaluation reports be scheduled in future exercises until the exercise is near its close. The requirement of another Daily Report, following a summary report, is an anomaly that undermines the continuity of interest of the rank and file of participants. The Daily Reports were considered a useful device in the exercise to keep the executive staff, ODM, and FCDA currently informed concerning the most important developments and about areas of interagency coordination which need clarification in order to assure effective operations.

7. Adequacy of security provisions. The fact that many of the basic documents--ODA Briefing Document (Secret), ODM Key Document (Secret), and USDA Organizational Document (Secret)--were highly classified information created operational problems. The situation was aggravated and confused by some ODM information being classified Secret in the yellow "briefing" books while the identical information had been earlier and separately distributed as unclassified. Further, the security classification and manner or form of transmission of defense orders and other actions based upon classified Executive Orders and other classified documents needs clarification.

It is urged that future exercises be carried on with a minimum of classified documents. In those instances where documents must be classified, they might be held for use as policy guidance for the top administrative staffs of the agencies and, insofar as possible, an unclassified paraphrased statement be provided for operational use.

The quarters occupied by USDA at Repoint could be effectively secured under emergency conditions against unauthorized entrance. Because of the necessity of making long range commitments for exclusive occupancy of particular buildings, and the relatively late revision in the dates for Operation Alert 1956, the USDA shared one wing of its headquarters building with an organization not participating in the exercise. However, the quarters were blocked off and it is believed that adequate measures were taken for the protection of classified information under the general conditions pertaining to the exercise. Appropriate safekeeping facilities, in accordance with prescribed regulations, were provided for the storage of classified documents not in use. All personnel were cleared Confidential or higher.

B. Essential wartime functions tested.

The essential wartime functions and activities tested during Operation Alert 1956 are commented on in the following paragraphs. Summaries of major simulated actions taken as they relate to food and supporting items are contained in attachments 5, 6, and 7. Summaries of actions taken and

evaluations of the exercise in respect to (a) defense from biological or chemical warfare against animals and crops, and (b) the prevention and control of fires caused by enemy attack in rural areas are included in Parts III and IV, respectively. It should be noted that all of the essential agricultural functions were not tested during the exercise.

General. Further planning, refinement and common understanding of the emergency organization structure, delegated authorities, and working relationships are needed. Many of the actions taken by USDA are dependent on programs initiated by other agencies. For example, this is true in the fields of fuel and energy, transportation, labor and construction machinery. Advance knowledge is necessary of control measures likely to be used, priorities to be assigned, and early intelligence on damage to and remaining availability of these facilities essential to agriculture.

Problems were posed in a few of these areas to the delegate agencies but in some cases replies were not received. (However, a 77 percent response was received, which perhaps would be good under real emergency conditions.) Consequently, it was not possible in all instances of need for USDA to proceed in initiating field actions to supplement field authorities and, thus, to protect the interests of agriculture in relation to its importance in a war economy. A similar situation arose in relation to the production of food and fiber and in the balance and importance of component parts. Rather than being a criticism, this merely points out that in this area there is a necessity for prompt actions by the responsible agencies as a basis for instituting the long range steps which are essential to an effective food and agriculture program.

An especially important relationship which needs more precise definition is the scope and understanding of ODM-FCDA delegations to USDA and other delegate agencies, which in turn hinges on a clearer delineation of the respective responsibilities of ODM and FCDA. Still another area which needs careful and definitive consideration is the relation of Federal defense mobilization to the powers which would be exercised in an emergency by State governors. It would be impossible, for example, to run a food program if orders issued nationally could be countermanded in particular States.

1. Damage assessment. USDA was amply prepared at Repoint to receive and evaluate damage information, although a number of procedural improvements were made during the exercise. Assessment of damages, and their corollary effects, such as large movements of evacuees, made possible the early identification of temporary critical food supply areas.

The nature of the damage information received, including delays in receipt, was such that it was very difficult to develop reliable conclusions on damage to food stocks and facilities. More concise summaries of points attacked, ground zeros, areas affected by fallout, and related information would be desirable.

2. Salvage and protection of food stocks. The exercise indicated that more definitive basic policy decisions are needed on such matters as food priorities based on the essentiality of various food commodities for purposes of proper utilization of manpower, processing facilities and materials required for rehabilitation or the protection and distribution of food supplies remaining in good condition after an attack. This problem points up the need to reduce the vulnerability of important facilities wherever that is practicable, including their location outside the immediate critical areas.

3. Evaluation of food requirements and supplies. Generally, the overall food supply appeared adequate for the immediate period of the exercise and perhaps for at least a year ahead, based on the attack assumptions for the test exercise. Major problems arose, however, in effecting distribution of available supplies due to transportation limitations and very severe damage to food wholesale facilities in many important distribution centers. It is important that future planning provide for more effective interchange of information between USDA and other control agencies. To illustrate, pre-planning of such matters as routing and handling of substantial in-transit food supplies should be agreed upon and should recognize the realities of food needs and emergency problems.

In order to evaluate intelligently problems of food replenishment and initiate effective action the USDA needs timely information such as food stocks remaining, the capacity of remaining food facilities, the scope of the feeding problem in specific areas, etc. State and local civil defense and USDA, cooperating, need to develop more comprehensive food supply and reporting plans. More emphasis should be placed on development of data on processing plants and distribution facilities, and the vulnerability of such plants and facilities, in order to permit more accurate and comprehensive damage analysis and food availability estimates. Also, decisions are needed in the field of credit and other financing arrangements to accomplish rehabilitation of processing and distributing facilities determined to be essential.

4. Food allocations and distribution control. The exercise was of too short duration to effectively test a function of this kind which, except for the allocation of relatively small quantities of foods to meet local emergency requirements, involves the solution of long-range problems. It is not possible to reach any conclusive determination on the longer range overall food requirements, or the need for allocation or other controls on food until the needs of claimant agencies are known. For example, the needs of such important claimant agencies as the State and Interior Departments were not received during the exercise. Information from the Defense and Commerce Departments was not received until the closing hours of the exercise. This is understandable because the development of requirements of this magnitude requires days if not weeks of preparation. It would be helpful in a future exercise to have assumed requirements for all claimancy areas at the outset of the exercise.

It is not clear whether the FCDA or the USDA is responsible for determining and acting as claimant agency for civilian food requirements, and whether State or USDA is responsible in the Allied Nations claimancy area. Since USDA has all the basic information, background and experience to handle these functions, it would facilitate action if food requirements for U. S. civilians, except for local procurements from retail or wholesale outlets to meet emergent post-attack needs, were clearly delegated to USDA. This area of delegation is now confused by assignment of claimancy to FCDA and allocation to ODM (re: ODM Operational Assignments Nos. 2 and 10, and FCDA Operational Assignment No. 2). Further, the question of whether State (ICA) or USDA serve as claimant for Allied Nations requirements should be resolved and clearly delegated. USDA and WSA should work out a well understood plan for the handling of price freeze orders. Similarly, it is essential that effective standby plans be developed for the distribution of available foods. To assure timely action and effective operations in this area it is essential that present uncertainties be removed. The exercise showed that USDA must improve its knowledge of the national wholesale food situation for emergency purposes. Particularly, USDA should possess data indicating the probable degree of concentration of wholesale food stocks in target areas.

Clarification is needed of the arrangements, if any, that are made with respect to the suspension of tariffs where such action might be necessary to implement the food supply. Also, it appears that authority has not been delegated to USDA to suspend import quotas except in the case of sugar. In order to assure an effective food program in an emergency this authority should be provided.

5. Food procurement and supply. As reported in attachment 6 summarizing major simulated actions taken, a food order was issued outlining the basic rules for the requisitioning of food. Also, a related order was issued pertaining to the operation of a food priorities system, and one pertaining to antihoarding of food. USDA field offices were issued the necessary procurement instructions and requisitioning authorization essential to activating a food shipment program to alleviate food shortage distress areas. Some clarification is desirable, however, as to the extent to which FCDA statutory authority with respect to the requisitioning of food has been delegated to USDA.

6. Food and fiber production. This area develops and carries out programs to assure the best use of agricultural resources, and to obtain supply objectives based on requirements and supply evaluation. It includes administrative supervision to the State and county offices which are responsible, among other things, for the application of production goals and incentives on the farm; allocation of essential farm requisites and manpower; obtaining essential data regarding production capacities, and requirements of materials, equipment and manpower at the farm level.

The exercise showed very clearly the urgent need for advance orientation in both organizational and procedural matters of personnel at Repoint and at field locations. One of the major defects was the need for wider, and

better informed, participation of field offices in order to make the exercise more realistic. Another major deficiency in the production area was the lack of overall policy direction. For example, perhaps basic decisions could be made as to the development of standards or criteria for determining the relative essentiality of various commodities—those likely to be most critical in an emergency. This would assist planning as to type of production, processing, and distribution programs needed. Specific price policy decisions would be most helpful relative to type and extent of incentives needed. The development of any standby production program, which would require adjustment to meet conditions actually experienced, is greatly influenced by these basic decisions over broad areas.

7. Non-food requirements and allocations. The ability of USDA to operate effectively in future tests or an actual emergency will depend in great measure on the readiness of USDA itself and of other Government agencies with respect to supporting plans and orders, i.e., priority assistance, rationing, etc. Insofar as practicable USDA should be informed in advance concerning the nature of all possible orders which may affect agriculture regardless of the control or delegate agency from which the basic orders would emanate. USDA could then develop related standby orders, directives, and regulations for timely implementation either during an exercise or in emergency. Agriculture is a large user of non-food materials and equipment and any readiness actions which can be taken will facilitate and help to assure the production, processing and distribution of an adequate food supply and of other products from the land.

8. Agricultural manpower requirements. Experience in Operation Alert 1956 demonstrated that USDA and the manpower agencies are in a position to handle manpower problems relating to food production in a reasonably prompt and efficient manner. Manpower responsibilities in USDA are primarily one of liaison and claimancy relationship with the manpower agencies.

Further planning should include the clarification of the manpower assignment within USDA in all phases of food management and production and supporting activities. Also, methods and procedures should be developed for keeping State and local USDA offices and agriculture in general currently advised of the manpower responsibilities, policies and procedures which would be followed under the conditions assumed to exist during the exercise.

9. Other--Coordination of field activities. The establishment of the USDA Regional Liaison Representative organization and the supporting staffs at field communications coordination centers was consummated at such a late date that time did not permit the providing of an outline of responsibilities and necessary operating procedures. As a result delays were experienced during the early part of the exercise in activating the field locations on a uniform and coordinated basis. This can be overcome, however, to assure prompt and effective action in the future by the development and appropriate distribution of realistic basic plans and statements of policy,

relationships, and procedures for operations at the various levels of field office responsibilities. An important element in instructions for this purpose will be a concise and understandable statement of working relations at the Regional, State, and local levels with FCDA, ODM, and other agencies having defense responsibilities.

C. Other agricultural supporting activities participating in Operation Alert 1956.

In addition to the Agricultural Research Service and the Forest Service (reports included in Parts III and IV), all USDA program agencies were represented at the exercise. In some instances these groups participated on a limited scale but for the most part acted as observers and as consultants in their specialized fields to the functions being actively tested in the exercise. The following program agencies were represented:

Agricultural Conservation Program Service  
Farmer Cooperative Service  
Federal Extension Service  
Soil Conservation Service  
Commodity Exchange Authority  
Foreign Agricultural Service  
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation  
Farmers Home Administration  
Rural Electrification Administration

The Agricultural Marketing Service and Commodity Stabilization Service provide the great majority of staff which activated the "food" functions tested during the exercise.



PART II

Classified information --  
given only limited distribution.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

PART III

AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SERVICE -- OPERATION ALERT 1956

I. Significant items of accomplishment

The Agricultural Research Service was active at Repoint in combating diseases against animals and crops that were deliberately introduced by enemy agents as an element of biological warfare. The eradication operations carried on through the field offices with the cooperation of State officials were divided into three phases: the initial outbreak; wide dissemination of the disease; and identification, containment and eradication of the condition.

Foot-and-mouth disease

The initial outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the Chicago stockyards and in shipments from the Omaha stockyards spread to areas in 12 states. All infected and exposed animals in the stockyards were eradicated immediately. State-Federal emergency disease eradication organizations were activated and the areas placed under quarantine. By July 25, all infected and exposed animals in the areas of the 12 states had been disposed of and the premises cleaned and disinfected notwithstanding the fact that the success of the effort was seriously threatened during the exercise. The lack of state funds in one state for matching Federal funds for indemnity payments was overcome by the Secretary's declaration of an extraordinary emergency which permitted Federal payment of full indemnities. In another state where there was an outbreak in a herd of feeder cattle, lack of cooperation by state officials presented a problem because the Federal Government does not have authority to enter premises for inspection purposes or to require destruction of infected animals even though it was willing to pay full indemnity. The owner of the herd was persuaded by other cattlemen to agree voluntarily to the destruction of his animals.

Fowl Plague

An outbreak of this disease appeared in an import shipment in New Jersey which indicated the disease was intentionally introduced. Action was immediately taken to prohibit air-ocean-import-export shipments of livestock and poultry to prevent further introduction. New Jersey officials placed a quarantine on the affected areas of that State. A shipment of pheasants indirectly exposed to the disease was located in North Carolina and with State cooperation all infected and exposed birds were destroyed and the farms cleaned and disinfected.

Meat inspection

The field meat inspection force was reorganized to safeguard the meat supply in damaged areas through emergency inspections and provide inspection service in support areas where increased production schedules were required.

#### Golden Nematode

This dangerous pest, apparently intentionally introduced, was found in a seed-potato producing area in Aroostock County, Maine. A cooperative program with State officials was promptly developed with the result that the infested properties and commodities were placed under State regulation, a survey of potato fields started, potato shipments traced, cleaning and fumigating of equipment started, and Federal regulation imposed to govern interstate shipments of host products and other disease carriers.

#### Mediterranean Fruit Fly

When this pest was found in a citrus packing shed in Riverside County, California, that State promptly complied with a request that it institute regulations pending establishment of a Federal quarantine which requires about 30 days. This action prevented movement of unauthorized products from the area. Surveys were undertaken to delimit the infestation.

#### Khapra Beetle

When this beetle, one of the most destructive stored grain pests known, was found in 4 Oregon counties, the State immediately established regulations on the movement of grain from the infested properties, arrangements were made to fumigate infestations, and surveys initiated to determine if there were other infested areas in the Columbia River Basin.

#### Radiological Defense

This office evaluated and provided information on radioactive fall-out relating to agricultural processing for ARS, AMS and CSS action programs.

In the development of work schedules of farmers in zones affected by fallout, it became obvious that such guidance and directions should be based on a balancing of the value of the livestock or crop gains against the damage to or possible loss of humans.

#### II. Appraisal of readiness of the USDA to meet Operation Alert 1956 emergency conditions with comments on the areas requiring emphasis in future planning and the status of supporting plans.

#### Biological Warfare Against Animals

The readiness to deal with outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease and fowl plague under existing authority in Operation Alert 1956 proved

to be exceptionally good. The State-Federal plan for handling such outbreaks, based on actual experience, proved to be adequate although future plans should provide for Federal authority to carry out eradication activities in States where cooperation is lacking.

Meat Inspection

The highly decentralized meat inspection organization demonstrated that it could operate effectively with a minimum of central direction.

Biological Warfare Against Crops

While there was general readiness to cope with the problems of checking or eradicating infestations of plant pests there is some need for strengthening. There were indications that some confusion exists in the field as to geographical areas of responsibility between USDA and FCDA boundaries. There was need for more records at Repoint and better indoctrination of field personnel.

Radiological Defense

Operation Alert 1956 emphasized the importance of and the need for experts in the field of radiation to deal with problems relating to the hazards of radioactive fallout.

Since ARS conducts research in the field of radioactive isotopes, works in close cooperation with AEC and has a number of personnel trained and experienced in this field, it is suggested that for future operations and for the emergency organization, that this office of damage assessment and radiological defense be developed as the Department's source for technical and expert advice and information on problems dealing with radioactive fallout in agricultural areas. This service would be made available to those agencies of Agriculture whose activities in the food field will be determined by the degree of contamination in the area.

The preparation of a minimum exposure schedule indicated that the denial periods suggested by ODM late in the exercise should be reviewed and approved by FCDA and AEC with the final table presented as a guide for future operations and emergencies. Such schedules should be based on denial periods, predicted isodose zones, effect of radiation levels on humans of different ages, and other information disseminated by HEW, FCDA and AEC. Where representatives of these agencies are not available in affected areas, guidance based on such schedules might be given by county agents or other local USDA personnel.

III. Suggestions for improvement in the conduct of the exercise

The location of ground zeros and fallout patterns are essential to effective planning. Adequate and timely data for damage assessment purpose should be made available.

Consideration should be given to stockpiling of materials essential to plant pest control which may be in short supply because of foreign origin. An example is oil of angelica seed which has recently been developed as an efficient Medfly lure.

IV. A listing of all major matters not satisfactorily resolved, including those due to failure to get decisions from, or the cooperation of, other agencies and suggestions for correction.

There is no Federal authority to proceed with measures to eradicate outbreaks of animal and poultry diseases where states are unwilling to cooperate. While this presents no problem in regular cooperative programs on diseases common to this country, it could be costly in case of an outbreak of a foreign disease. Near the end of Operation Alert 1956, the FCDA Administrator delegated certain authorities to the USDA which may provide the necessary authority under emergency conditions to deal with such outbreaks.

Emergency plans are inadequate for other agencies informing USDA of new port and air facilities for international traffic so that proper quarantine inspection arrangements can be made to avoid the hazards of introducing new animal and plant diseases.

An effective priority system for aircraft, fuel and repairs for control of agricultural and forest pests should be worked out and approved in advance.

Consideration is being given to amending the Plant Quarantine Act to authorize the ARS Administrator to promulgate emergency quarantines without a hearing. Under normal conditions, hearings are required that may take up to 30 days.

Knowledge necessary for the assessment of types and extent of radiation damage to animals is far too slight for establishment of standards of livestock damage, particularly in the most needed zones of low or medium fallout.

There are inadequate guides and information establishing radiation tolerances for man and for clearing such information with AEC, FCDA and USPHS. There is also a lack of clear delegation of responsibility for attention and action in this area as it concerns farm workers tending livestock and crops. Attention should also be given to the problem of dealing with the danger of human beings involved with the processing of agricultural commodities. Agricultural officials will be prepared to recommend the use or salvage of commodities that have been exposed to radioactive fallout insofar as their wholesomeness for food is concerned. The danger to people who will be involved in the slaughtering and processing of such products would seem to be the logical responsibility of the Public Health Service. However, it would seem that the unavailability of Public Health Service personnel to meet these problems where they arise would appear adequate reason for a clear statement as to the delegation of responsibility for this phase of the protection of man from radioactive exposure.

Clarification is needed of delegation from FCDA to HEW regarding the movement of radioactively contaminated food products from rural contaminated areas. Assignment of responsibility for establishment and enforcement of quarantines is uncertain.

Information should be developed on protective clothing for farm workers in fallout areas.

A clear delineation of responsibility between USDA and FCDA should be made as to educational materials needed for emergency conservation and utilization of household food, clothing, textile furnishings, and equipment.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

PART IV

FOREST SERVICE -- OPERATION ALERT 1956

I. Significant items of accomplishment

In carrying out the FCDA delegation on Rural Fire Defense, the National Rural Fire Defense Committee, consisting of representatives of the Department of Agriculture (Forest Service and Extension Service), Department of the Interior, and the Association of State Foresters, was active at Repoint. Each of the eight USDA area headquarters was manned with a Forest Service representative and fire personnel. Some State Rural Fire Defense committees were activated.

Fire problems and actions carried out with field representatives of Rural Fire Defense in all USDA regions involved more than 1,200 fires, both actual and simulated, covering an area of approximately 1,000,000 acres. Many of the large problem fires in West Coast areas were still uncontrolled at the termination of Operation Alert, due to radiation and to difficulties in securing equipment, manpower, supplies, and transport priorities.

Action was undertaken in planning for increased production of naval stores to replenish stockpile losses and in planning emergency use of ASC County offices.

Without specific delegation or request from the Department of Commerce the Department (a) determined the part that national forest timber can play in alleviating an acute lumber shortage, and (b) facilitated the use of surplus pulpwood in Georgia for use by pulpmills in other States.

To meet field operating needs, authority was delegated to (a) make local purchases of supplies from commercial sources, and (b) extend authority under the Emergency Financing System to include obligations and expenditures for fighting fires to all rural lands regardless of ownership.

II. Appraisal of readiness of the USDA to meet Operation Alert 1956 emergency conditions with comments on the areas requiring emphasis in future planning and the status of supporting plans

- A. There was no understanding with ODM and Commerce on ways in which the Forest Service could assist in appraising damage and maintaining production in the forest products industries. Clear-cut plans will need to be developed.
- B. The Forest Service planning programs, including that for Rural Fire Defense delegation, were not sufficiently complete to have established and submitted estimates to delegate authority of essential needs of food, manpower, gas, oil, transportation, clearance, etc.

- C. Rural Fire Defense plans had not been completed by States and FCDA regions. Hence, the inter-agency communication network at local levels did not function completely.
- D. The lack of a "stockpile" of specialized rural fire-fighting equipment items was very apparent. Such equipment is urgently needed.

The test showed that with some amplification, the Forest Service radio network will be an effective auxiliary communication system. Needs for this use will be considered in plans for stockpiling.

An effective priority system for fire-fighting needs, including transport, manpower, and equipment, should be worked out and approved in advance.

In general, because the Forest Service delegations involve types of work which are normally being carried out -- except for scale of operations -- with a highly decentralized organization, the "alert" showed a readiness and ability to function up to the point under an emergency where priority functions of other agencies under their responsibilities made correlation necessary. That is the major "bottleneck" to prompt and effective fire control action.

### III. Suggestions for improvement in the conduct of the exercise

In general, the ODM and FCDA instructions for the conduct of the exercise should more specifically recognize the relative importance of fire control in order to place its operation on a proportionate competitive basis with other claimant agencies for essential facilities and resources necessary to properly redeem its delegated responsibility. This recognition as indicated below would provide for greater utilization of the instructions within the rural fire defense organization, and reduce the extent of rewriting to efficiently activate fire forces.

The National Rural Fire Defense Committee suggests that provision be made for technical counsel to liaison representatives of USDA at Lowpoint and regional FCDA locations. The State Civil Defense organizations should be activated in future exercises to provide a better test of preparedness.

Determination should be made prior to an emergency as to the extent freedom can be granted to delegate agencies in using their essential facilities and resources.

### IV. A listing of all major matters not satisfactorily resolved, including those due to failure to get decisions from, or the cooperation of, other agencies and suggestions for correction

- A. The exercise disclosed a need for a master plan which outlines how Rural Fire Defense operates in an emergency, including its relationship with FCDA and ODM at all levels.

FCDA Delegation 2 to Agriculture and redelegation to the Forest Service of functions relating to the prevention and control of fires in rural areas is a full delegation to take direct action in an emergency. Rural fire defense plans are being organized on this basis and will be completed in this manner unless advised otherwise.

- (1) Regular forest and rural fire protection agencies will continue to handle fires in an emergency to the maximum extent possible with their facilities.
- (2) Within a State, cooperating agencies will call upon each other for assistance as provided in State Rural Fire Defense plans. Each State committee will have an executive officer to direct coordination in an emergency.
- (3) Problems and needs which cannot be handled within a State will be referred to the Regional USDA Liaison Officer, who will have an adequate fire staff.
- (4) Problems and needs which cannot be handled within a region will be referred to Agriculture Repoint for action. The national Rural Fire Defense Committee will have an adequate executive staff at Repoint to handle rural fire matters. The national committee will meet on policy matters and direct inter-regional coordination.
- (5) FCDA -- During an emergency the FCDA Rural Fire offices will be contacted only where problems in obtaining men, materials, equipment, and transport cannot be solved within the means available to the fire action agencies and support in obtaining assistance must be obtained from higher authority. The job of FCDA in these cases will be to provide such assistance in breaking "bottlenecks" so the action agencies may proceed with the fire control job.

This contact with FCDA will take place at the following levels:

- (a) At State levels between the State RFD Executive Officer and the State FCDA representative.
- (b) At regional levels between the Forest Service fire representative and the regional FCDA office.
- (c) At the national office between Repoint and Lowpoint. Every effort will first be made to secure local priority action in problem solutions.

B. It is desirable that there be added to the list of specific essential emergency functions such activities as timber production, both on national forests and State and private lands; and national forest grazing.

The procedures for obtaining priorities and the establishment of rural fire-fighting as an activity requiring such priorities in claiming transport facilities, supplies, rural fire-fighting equipment, and manpower is not satisfactorily solved. Fire control work is of such a nature that even an hour's delay is serious. For that reason, advance priorities are essential. More advance work with FCDA, ODM and others is needed.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

PART V

"EMERGENCY FINANCIAL SYSTEM" -- OPERATION ALERT 1956

The proposed Emergency Financial System, issued for testing during Operation Alert 1956, is a basically sound and workable plan which with minor modifications, with necessary clarification of a few points, and with the opportunity for placing all personnel concerned in a state of readiness with respect thereto, should provide adequately for the administration of necessary budgetary and fiscal functions under emergency conditions.

The plan was not made available in sufficient time before Operation Alert 1956 to permit a thoroughgoing analysis and appraisal, or to allow the kind of advance preparation which would be required to make a full and complete test. Primarily for this reason, and at the request of the Bureau of the Budget, the test in the Department of Agriculture was limited to three specific areas and was implemented in the field on a very restricted basis. Despite this, we believe the test was valuable in developing a number of problems which must be overcome.

It became evident early in Operation Alert that there is need for a uniform understanding among the agencies regarding the relationship of the emergency financial authorities to the emergency functions of the agencies, particularly delegated responsibilities. This became apparent when FCDA requested estimates of financial requirements, presumably in order to allocate necessary funds for carrying out activities delegated by that agency. It was our understanding that (contrary to the usual practice in the financing of peacetime activities) the emergency financial authorities, including the use of funds under the "Emergency Appropriation Act of 1957," would be exercised directly by each agency for all emergency functions, including delegated functions. In other words, ODM, FCDA, etc., would not be expected to furnish funds for carrying out responsibilities delegated by them; instead, the delegate agencies would proceed directly to invoke the authorities of the "Emergency Financial Act of 1956" and to utilize funds made available under the "Emergency Appropriation Act of 1957." We believe this interpretation to be consistent with the proposed executive order and it would have the advantage of avoiding lost motion and delay in operations while awaiting the allocation of funds from another agency. This interpretation was confirmed by the Bureau of the Budget during Operation Alert. We recommend that steps be taken to make sure that all agencies understand this basic concept.

We have a number of comments on the plan as outlined in the proposed legislation, Executive Order, and Budget Bureau circular.

We believe Section 5 of the proposed authorizing act should be changed to read substantially as follows: (New language underscored, language to be deleted enclosed in brackets)

"The President shall establish on a standby basis and maintain in readiness an emergency financial system for the Executive Branch of the United States Government, consistent with emergency accounting principles and standards authorized to be established under Section 6, which may provide for [fiscal operations to be conducted] obligating, expending, and utilizing, during an emergency, funds and financing authorizations available to the Executive Branch of the Government prior to the emergency without regard to existing laws controlling or regulating the obligation [or] expenditure, or utilization of such funds or financing authorizations [of public funds,] or relating to fiscal limitations or procedures, as may be necessary to carry on essential functions during [an] such emergency."

This change would spell out and more clearly authorize the use of pre-emergency funds and financing authorizations on the basis contemplated in the plan. This type of clarification of the proposed basic authority seems to us to be highly desirable and necessary to assure the essential flexibility contemplated by the over-all system. Without it, it is not clear that pre-emergency funds could be used to finance emergency functions not presently carried on as a regular program responsibility.

A related matter, which requires clarification in the Executive Order and the Budget Bureau circular, concerns the application of the instructions to funds other than appropriations. In this Department, it is of particular importance to establish the status of the CCC borrowing authorization and Federal Crop Insurance Corporation capital funds under emergency conditions. It may be desirable to provide in the instructions for specific determinations to be made in advance by the Bureau of the Budget, in consultation with the agency concerned, with respect to the use during an emergency of financing authorizations other than appropriations.

Another area which is subject to misunderstanding has to do with the scope of the emergency financial system. It should be made abundantly clear that, while the plan affords wide latitude in the financing of emergency functions it does not, in and of itself, provide basic authority for the conduct of such functions. It should be emphasized that emergency functions carried out by an agency must be authorized in basic legislation or must be based on delegated authority from ODM, FCDA, or other agencies authorized to make such delegations. Any misunderstanding on this point could well result in chaotic operating conditions during an emergency.

We believe there is a basic inconsistency between the Emergency Financial System and "Plans for Continuing Disbursing for Civilian Agencies of the Government in the Event of an Emergency (Revision No. 2)," issued by the Treasury Department. Under the Treasury plan, new symbols and titles will be established for use during an emergency and new disbursing arrangements will be made. The Emergency Financial System contemplates the use of existing systems to the extent practicable and will provide supplemental emergency funds under the existing account symbols and titles. This is a conflict which obviously must be resolved before the Emergency Financial System can be put into effect.

Paragraph 4c of the Budget Bureau circular specifies that "unused allocations of emergency funds will automatically expire at the close of business 15 days after the appropriation act becomes law" when an appropriation act for an essential function is passed. This appears to be inconsistent with Section 3 of the authorizing act which states that such funds shall not remain available for any particular function after (a) enactment into law of any definite appropriation available for that function, or (b) enactment of the applicable appropriation act without any provisions for that function. The act does not seem to allow for any period of use after enactment of such appropriation act. However, if a period of time is to be allowed, 30 days appears to be more realistic than 15 days.

In Section 2 of the authorizing act, we believe the word "permanent" should be deleted.

In paragraph 2 of item 7 of the Budget Bureau circular, it is assumed that the inclusion of the words "To the extent possible" would relieve agencies of any unreasonable burden incident to supplying the specific types of information and justification data enumerated. It might be particularly difficult to supply under emergency conditions the backup data on personnel and obligations by objects.

Another matter which needs to be clarified is the nature of the authority granted under the emergency plan to use pre-emergency funds without regard to pre-emergency restrictions on their use. We understand from informal discussion of this concept that it does not envision that all funds in an agency could be merged into a single account, even though the authority is seemingly stated broadly enough to permit this. It would be very desirable to state more precisely what this instruction is intended to authorize.

In the last paragraph of the Proposed General Accounting Office Emergency Accounting Principles and Standards it is suggested that some of the philosophy of the proposed Executive Order be included by inserting the following words at the end of the last sentence: "except that where it is impracticable or impossible to follow such prescribed accounting procedures, each responsible officer or employee shall be held accountable only in cases of bad faith or lack of due care."

Our evaluation of the test of the Emergency Financial System conducted by this Department during Operation Alert 1956 is that the plan is basically one that will work. The agencies of the Department which participated were able to prepare the financial schedule and justification without too much difficulty. A copy of the submission to the Bureau of the Budget is attached. However, we cannot emphasize too strongly the very real necessity for adequate advance preparation of all concerned with respect to the nature and operation of the emergency financial plan. No thorough evaluation of the Department's ability to operate or of the problems which must be overcome in establishing fiscal processes on an emergency basis can be made until over-all directives are issued to require a system to be established and in a state of readiness throughout the Department. Unless and until this is done, the Department will not be prepared for an emergency from the standpoint of budgetary and fiscal administration.



## UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

PART VI

## ESTIMATED COST OF PARTICIPATION

## 1. National Relocation Center - Repoint

## (a) Out-of-pocket costs:

Travel expenses .....	\$14,820
Other: Communications .....	6,835
Truck and space rental .....	2,089
Miscellaneous .....	<u>141</u>
Salaries (overtime paid and CT) .....	<u>3,730</u>
Total estimated out-of-pocket cost - Repoint .....	<u>27,615</u>

(b) Salaries of participating personnel .....	<u>46,559</u>
Total estimated cost - Repoint .....	<u><u>74,174</u></u>

## 2. Field Locations

## (a) Out-of-pocket costs:

Travel expenses .....	18,579
Other: Communications .....	5,000
Miscellaneous .....	<u>1,303</u>
Salaries (overtime paid and CT) .....	<u>1,760</u>
Total estimated out-of-pocket costs - Field .....	<u>26,642</u>

(b) Salaries of participating personnel .....	<u>37,530</u>
Total estimated cost - Field .....	<u><u>64,172</u></u>

Total out-of-pocket costs .....	\$54,257
Total ("contributed") salaries .....	84,089
Grand total cost of exercise .....	<u><u>\$138,346</u></u>



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
Office of the Secretary  
• Washington 25, D. C.

July 11, 1956

MEMORANDUM

To: USDA Regional Liaison Representatives  
From: The Under Secretary  
Subject: Administrative Preparation for Operation Alert 1956

1. Composition of Advisory Group

Attached is a list of the technical personnel who will advise you in your capacity as Regional Liaison Representatives during Operation Alert 1956. (These personnel will also be the nucleus of a group to advise you on defense matters following Operation Alert.) They will be located during the exercise at the USDA alternate regional headquarters.

Clerical personnel will be needed during the exercise at the USDA alternate regional headquarters and you should make the necessary arrangements for the availability of such personnel. In some cases it may be possible for them to be furnished by the host office.

Arrangements for communications personnel at the USDA alternate regional headquarters sites have already been made and these personnel have the necessary security clearance - see RLR Memorandum No. 2A.

2. Briefing Meeting and Other Action Prior to Exercise

It is suggested that you meet with your advisory group listed in the attachment as soon as possible in order to discuss the exercise and to:

- a. Arrange for selection of any representatives who may be needed at civil defense sites in accordance with RLR Memorandum No. 2.
- b. Arrange for designation of an alternate to serve with you at the Regional Mobilization Committee site. (Two additional alternates will be needed if there are two Regional Mobilization Committees in your Area.) Your advisory group will determine the agency (or agencies) from which the alternates should be chosen and the representative of that agency will arrange to make the personnel available. If it is necessary to select a member of your advisory group for a special assignment, the member's agency should select a substitute for the advisory group.

- c. Designate a member of your advisory group who will be in charge at the USDA alternate regional headquarters during the exercise since you will be at the RMC site.
- d. See that each member of the advisory group arranges through his agency for necessary security clearance and for a civil defense identification card prior to the exercise.

Alternates in the RMC's require "top secret" clearance and others require clearance of at least "confidential". Ideally, at least one stenographer at the alternate regional liaison headquarters should be cleared for "top secret", but in any event at least one stenographer should be cleared for access to classified material. If it appears that you will not be able to secure the necessary security clearance in time for the exercise, please notify this office promptly.

At the same meeting you may wish to discuss problems which will be used during the exercise - see RLR Memorandum No. 2B.

Please keep this office informed of the various designations indicated under a, b and c above.

### 3. Conduct of the Exercise

At the start of the exercise at 10:00 a.m., EST, July 20, you and the RMC alternate will proceed to the location of the Regional Mobilization Committee for duty during the exercise. The location of these sites will be obtained from the Regional Mobilization Committees.

USDA representatives to serve in a liaison capacity at the civil defense regional headquarters will proceed to the respective civil defense regional offices.

Personnel on your advisory group will proceed to the USDA alternate regional headquarters.

You already have the location of the civil defense regional headquarters and the USDA alternate regional headquarters, and, if there is any further question, please let us know.

Activities in the field will be conducted in accordance with provisions of Secretary's Memorandum of June 19 (II B 2 and 3) relating to participation of the Department in Operation Alert 1956.

Attachment

/s/ True D. Morse

The following persons have been approved to serve as staff assistants for the Regional Liaison Representative, Richard D. Aplin, in Area 1 in connection with Operation Alert 1956.

AMS

Harry Watling  
Administrative Officer

Food Distribution Division  
408 Atlantic Ave., Rm. 707  
Boston 10, Massachusetts

ARS

Dr. Elvin R. Coon

Animal Disease Eradication Br.  
802 Customhouse Building  
Boston 9, Massachusetts

Mr. Warren G. Harding

Plant Pest Control Branch  
414 Mass. Dept. of Conservation  
15 Ashburton Place  
Boston 8, Massachusetts

CSS

Joseph A. Horn  
State Admin. Officer

New Hampshire ASC State Office  
29 Main Street  
Durham, New Hampshire

FES

Henry Hansen  
Assoc. Dir. of Extension

University of Connecticut  
Storrs, Connecticut

Alternate:

L. A. Bevan  
Dir. of Extension Service

University of New Hampshire  
Durham, New Hampshire

FS

Chas. L. Tebbe  
Regional Forester

6816 Market Street  
Upper Darby, Pennsylvania

The following persons have been approved to serve as staff assistants for the Regional Liaison Representative, Harley E. Banks, in Area 2 in connection with Operation Alert 1956.

AMS

Aubrey R. Waits  
Asst. District Supervisor

Tobacco Division  
620 South Broadway  
Lexington, Kentucky

ARS

Dr. Robert L. Knudson

Animal Disease Eradication Br.  
438 Old Post Office Bldg.  
3rd and State Sts.  
Columbus 15, Ohio

Substitute in Operation Alert  
for Dr. Knudson will be:

Dr. John B. Healy

315-317 W. Maine St.  
Frankfort, Kentucky

Mr. Charles N. Shephard

Plant Pest Control Branch  
314 Old Federal Building  
E. State and S. Third Sts.,  
Columbus 16, Ohio

CSS

Fred B. Wachs, Jr.  
Acting Administrative Officer

Kentucky ASC State Office  
Mill & Maxwell Streets  
Lexington, Kentucky

FES

Ernest J. Nesius  
Associate Dir. of Extension

University of Kentucky  
Lexington 29, Kentucky

FS

E. M. Karger

6816 Market Street  
Upper Darby, Pennsylvania

The following persons have been approved to serve as staff assistants for the Regional Liaison Representative, Walter T. McKay, in Area 5 in connection with Operation Alert 1956.

AMS

Raymond Totoro  
Asst. Area Supervisor

Food Distribution Division  
111½ Commerce Street  
Dallas 2, Texas

ARS

Dr. F. L. Herchenroeder

Animal Inspection and  
Quarantine Branch  
College Station, Texas

Mr. Douglas M. McEachern

Plant Pest Control Branch  
569 Federal Building  
P. O. Box 2749  
San Antonio 6, Texas

CSS

Grover C. Carothers, Jr.  
State Administrative Officer

Texas ASC State Office  
U.S.D.A. Building  
College Station, Texas

FES

G. G. Gibson  
Director of Extension Service

Texas A. & M. College  
College Station, Texas

FS

Fred H. Kennedy

510 2nd Street, N. W.  
Albuquerque, New Mexico

The following persons have been approved to serve as staff assistants for the Regional Liaison Representative, Russell H. James, in Area 3 in connection with Operation Alert 1956.

AMS

T. J. Wilson  
Asst. Area Supervisor

Food Distribution Division  
50 - 7th Street, N.E.  
Atlanta, Georgia

ARS

Dr. Chester J. Mikel

Animal Disease Eradication Br.  
614 Atlanta National Building  
50 Whitehall St., S.W.  
Atlanta 3, Georgia

Mr. Harold E. Welker

Plant Pest Control Branch  
708 Grand Building  
649 Mulberry Street  
Macon, Georgia

CSS

John F. Bradley  
State Administrative Officer

Georgia ASC State Office  
Old Post Office Bldg.  
Athens, Georgia

FES

W. A. Sutton  
Director of Extension Service

University of Georgia  
Athens, Georgia

FS

C. Otto Lindh

50 Seventh Street, N.E.  
Atlanta 23, Georgia

The following persons have been approved to serve as staff assistants for the Regional Liaison Representative, James R. Dutton, in Area 6 in connection with Operation Alert 1956.

AMS

Harold Abel  
Agricultural Economist

Marketing Research Division  
339 New Custom House  
Denver 2, Colorado

ARS

Dr. Daniel F. Werring

Animal Disease Eradication Br.  
P. O. Box 1866 (Office - 215  
U. S. Post Office Bldg.)  
Lincoln 1, Nebraska

Substitute in Operation Alert  
for Dr. Werring Will Be:

Dr. H. E. Schaulis

300 Custom House  
Denver 2, Colorado

CSS

Andrew J. Mair  
State Administrative Officer

Colorado ASC State Office  
Room 2, New Custom House  
Denver 2, Colorado

FES

James E. Morrison  
Director of Extension Service

Colorado A. & M. College  
Fort Collins, Colorado

FS

Donald E. Clark

Federal Center  
Building 85  
Denver 7, Colorado

Alternate: David S. Nordwall,  
Asst. Regional Forester

Federal Center  
Building 85  
Denver 7, Colorado

The following persons have been approved to serve as staff assistants for the Regional Liaison Representative, Oscar F. Beyer, in Area 4 in connection with Operation Alert 1956.

ANS

Walter Ebling  
State Statistician

Agricultural Estimates  
421 S. State Capitol  
Madison, Wisconsin

ARS

Dr. Asa Winter

Animal Disease Eradication Br.  
Lewis Cass Office Bldg.  
Lansing, Michigan

Mr. Stanley Castell

Plant Pest Control Branch  
666 Main Street, P. O. Box 495  
Lafayette, Indiana

Substitute in Operation Alert  
for Dr. Asa Winter Will Be:

Dr. L. R. Barnes

418 Park Building  
611 Park Ave.,  
Indianapolis 4, Indiana

CSS

Kenneth H. Hoover  
State Administrative Officer

Wisconsin ASC State Office  
3010 E. Washington Avenue  
Madison 4, Wisconsin

FES

Henry L. Ahlgren  
Assoc. Dir. of Extension

University of Wisconsin  
Madison 6, Wisconsin

ES

H. D. Cochran

623 N. 2nd Street  
Milwaukee 3, Wisconsin

The following persons have been approved to serve as staff assistants for the Regional Liaison Representative, Charles A. Connaughton, in Area 7 in connection with Operation Alert 1956.

AMS

M. C. McGilvray  
Area Supervisor

Food Distribution Division  
Appraiser's Building  
630 Sansome Street  
San Francisco 11, Calif.

ARS

Mr. L. J. Padget

Plant Pest Control Branch  
Room M-7, 1515 Clay Street  
Oakland 12, California

Dr. Donald Miller

Animal Disease Eradication Br.  
P. O. Box 2439 (Office - 247  
Post Office Bldg.)  
Phoenix, Arizona

CSS

William J. Page  
State Administrative Officer

California ASC State Office  
2020 Milvia Street  
Berkeley 4, California

FES

George B. Alcorn  
Director of Extension Service

College of Agriculture  
University of California  
Berkeley 4, California

FS

Charles Connaughton, also designee

630 Sansome Street  
San Francisco 11, California

The following persons have been approved to serve as staff assistants for the Regional Liaison Representative, John Wenn, Jr., in Area 8 in connection with Operation Alert 1956.

AMS

R. H. Eaton  
Officer in Charge

Fruits and Vegetables Div.  
1218 S. W. Washington Street  
Portland 5, Oregon

ARS

Dr. A. G. Beagle

Animal Disease Eradication Br.  
P. O. Box 3701 (Office - 519  
Post Office Bldg.)  
Portland 8, Oregon

Dr. A. J. Culver

Plant Pest Control Branch  
Care Plant Pathology Dept.  
State College,  
Corvallis, Oregon

CSS

Arnold N. Bodtker  
State Administrative Officer

Oregon ASC State Office  
4th Floor, Ross Building  
209 S. W. 5th Avenue  
Portland 4, Oregon

FES

F. L. Ballard  
Assoc. Dir. of Extension

Oregon State College  
Corvallis, Oregon

FS

J. Herbert Stone

729 N. E. Oregon Street  
Portland 8, Oregon





## SUMMARY OF SIMULATED PROGRAM ACTIONS BY U.S.D.A.

Attachment 5

## OPERATION ALERT 1956 -- FOOD ACTIVITIES

ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS	COTTON	DAIRY	FRUITS & VEGETABLES	GRAIN	LIVESTOCK	OILS & PEANUTS	POULTRY	SUGAR	TOBACCO
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT	No significant losses of processing facilities. Losses of cotton and linters insignificant in view of supply.	Fluid milk processing and bottling capacity in target areas virtually demolished, necessitating fluid milk transport and waxed containers from outside areas.	Damages to fruit & vegetable processing plants light, but 40 percent of processed stocks lost. Major problems in handling of crops for fresh market due to heavy damage of market outlets. About two-thirds preservers' and picklers' facilities lost; major shortages of these products anticipated.	Spotty reports on grain terminal show about ten percent destroyed. About 28% flour milling capacity damaged or lost, mostly in East Coast areas, and Chicago-Buffalo-Minneapolis areas, requiring increased transportation to supply evacuation areas from outside sources.	Small loss of live animals and most stocks. Repair and increased use and more efficient use of undamaged plants expected to alleviate problems resulting from total or partial destruction of from one-fourth to one-half of slaughterhouses and processing facilities.	About half existing fats & oils refining plants destroyed. Loss of storage will cause bottlenecks in movement of oilseeds from farms to processing plants.	Supply of poultry products plentiful. No crippling damage to processing plants. Plants outside target areas affected by loss of power and effects of fallout. Poultry production loss small but may be affected by feed shortages. Data lacking on effects of fallout.	About two-thirds of Mainland cane refineries destroyed. Reliance must be placed on best and imported supplies; Heavy damage to cocoa stocks, only one month's supply of beans remained after attack. About one-third of molasses stocks destroyed, alcohol plants also lost.	No significant damage to cigarette manufacturing capacity. About 30% cigar leaf stocks damaged or destroyed and 35% cigar manufacturing facilities lost or critically damaged for 30 to 45 days. Slight damage to naval stores stocks.
SALVAGE AND PROTECTION OF FOOD STOCKS AND FACILITIES	About one million bales of cotton and linters damaged and destroyed. Field offices accounting for Government stocks. Developed information on cotton classes by States.	Estimates of stocks of dairy products developed and kept current. Salvaged dry milk & cheese stocks. Developed information on inspectors available for training in detecting radioactive foods. Arranged for disposition of cars of dairy products which could not be delivered to original consignees.	Developed estimates of inspectors available for emergency inspection and radiological monitoring duties. Disposed of 1,486 cars en route to Northeast area. Developed data re grain inspectors available for radiological monitoring training.	Losses of major commodities evaluated. Directed movement of unclaimed cars of cereals, primarily to Northeast area. Developed data re grain inspectors available for radiological monitoring training.	Substantial stocks of meat in attack areas lost. Arranged for utilization of stranded shipments. Measures considered to can surplus production expected in 2nd quarter after attack. Inspectors and graders reassigned to areas of expanded production.	Regional offices and industry asked to report on undamaged stocks and plant condition.	Two-thirds of storage stocks lost. This is not critical as total storage normally is about one week's consumption.	Requested reports on usable stocks from refineries, milk processors, importers & large industrial users. Asked ODM to reroute cargoes destined to bombed ports and arranged with refineries at other ports to take delivery.	Requested reports on measures taken - Action not required in view of tobacco supplies, and physical seizure of naval stores. Prepared lists of grading & inspection personnel by States.
EVALUATION OF FOOD REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPLIES	Heavy stocks of upland cotton and linters estimated well over years requirements for domestic requirements and export. Extra long staple not so satisfactory, recent year imports have been about double domestic production.	No serious difficulties reported re fluid milk distribution situation; supply of products sufficient for all requirements. Estimated production of milk & products for next 12 months.	Furnished estimates of quantities of fruits & vegetables available for emergency food use; supplied PCDA information on stocks of products and processing facilities by areas; provided ODM with information on supplies of survival items on hand in undamaged areas.	Estimates of available supplies developed by areas and furnished to requesting units.	ODM advised of availability of canned and other meats in undamaged areas. Submitted estimates of meat by locations in surplus areas to meet weekly needs in Northeast. Appraised availability of animal fats for export, and fair supply for rest of '56-'57 season. Planned actions to maintain markets at reasonable price levels.	Domestic requirements of edible fats & oils, peanuts & linseed oil exclude exports until 1956 crop supplies are available in October. Refining and manufacturing plant loss permits exports only of linseed and unrefined oil. Needs of evacuees in Northeast determined.	Current and prospective egg and poultry production estimates indicated generally adequate supplies.	Evaluated adequacy of mainland stocks; estimated anticipated supply from domestic crop.	Tobacco stocks adequate to meet expected requirements. Foreign tobacco stocks adequate; imports not needed for 30 days. Naval stores stocks appear in short supply, dependent upon emergency needs or use of alternative products.
FOOD ALLOCATIONS AND DISTRIBUTION CONTROL	Supply situation did not require specific control measures.	General export embargo and inventory freeze included evaporated milk. Dairy products released from freeze order.	Terminated export subsidy program on citrus. Recommended "set-aside" limitation on canned, frozen, and dried products to assure necessary supplies for military and other Government needs. Recommended order requiring certain important fresh produce be offered to USDA before public sale.	Submitted recommendations concerning freeze order and related allocation and distribution problems.	Advised several areas to utilize local supplies of meat and animals for civilian feeding rather than relying on unobtainable shipments of canned meat products. Established quantity limitations on Government stocks of canned meat for feeding in East Coast areas.	Recommended export embargo and removal of import quotas and fees on peanuts & peanut oils.	Set-aside orders recommended to assure priority of procurement by Government agencies. Retail stocks in critical areas released from freeze order because of perishable nature. Processor stocks released nation-wide because of adequate supplies and perishability. Price freeze feasible only in critical areas if administered by PCDA under direction of a agricultural committee.	Marketing and import controls of the Sugar Act suspended to facilitate acquisition of available sugar and to increase domestic production. Prepared procedure for release and acquisition of Government-owned Cuban stocks, and for collaboration with shippers and consignees of Puerto Rican and Hawaiian sugar.	Tobacco products not frozen in view of supply situation. Recommended Government stocks of naval stores be frozen and allocated to industry.
FOOD PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY	No procurement of upland or linters necessary in view of Government holdings and prospective August 1, 1956, carryover.	Purchased grades of product not previously price supported. Asked ODM to permit dealers under Federal milk orders to increase prices to producers. Arranged for release of stocks of cheese on PCDA requisition. Directed shipment of dairy products to Northeast.	Arranged for obtaining military supplies in response to Quartermaster requests for assistance in certain localities.	Advised field offices on purchase or requisition of flour, meal, beans and rice to be shipped into Northeast. Authorized disposition and use of Government-owned stocks. Government-owned wheat to be unloaded and milled.	Announced canned meat buying program. Industry urged to embargo overloaded markets and redirect livestock to best available markets. Recommended War Heat Board to advise on Government purchases and programs affecting industry.	Sources of supply ascertained and daily shipment schedules established for lard & shortening needs of Northeast evacuees.	Small eggs shipped PCDA in New York. Set aside used to provide 200 cars of chickens from Southeast each week to Northeast evacuee areas.	Negotiated procurement of all available supplies of Cuban sugar (about 3 million tons). Negotiations started for purchases of smaller quantities of Central & South American sugar. Purchase of 400 million pounds of cocoa (beans & finished form) from friendly foreign sources recommended. 1957 crop molasses will not be available for six months. Arrangements made to supply 1 lb. sugar per week for 14 million persons in Northeast area.	Developed voluntary program for emergency shipments of cigarettes to supply stricken areas on request of PCDA.
FOOD AND FIBER PRODUCTION	Recommended 1957 upland cotton acreage be diverted to other crops which may be in short supply. ASC State Committees, producer groups and oil mills asked to save supplies of S-1 variety extra long staple seed for 1957 crop. Production goals and incentive level price supports recommended for 1957 crop of extra long staple.	Released barley from CCC stocks for dairy feed.	Developed vegetable goals program.	Recommended removal of allotments & quotas on wheat and rice & elimination of base acreage on corn, and other changes in peace-time production adjustment programs.	No immediate programs for livestock production, but recommended revision of wool program to stimulate production.	Peanut marketing quotas removed to obtain maximum 1956 harvest for food and supplemental source of oil.	Feed shipped from undamaged areas to areas of local shortage. Estimated industry needs for critical tin, steel, boxes, etc.		Tobacco production controls & marketing quotas to be continued. Price incentive and emergency labor programs expected to increase production of naval stores.
NON-FOOD REQUIREMENTS AND ALLOCATIONS	ODM asked to put bale ties and buckles on critical materials list. Food Order issued to obtain reports on supplies and expected usage. Textile mills urged to take conservation measures so ties can be reused.	Equipment industry asked to develop small items for emergency distribution of fluid milk. Developed tin-plate requirements for 1956 seasonal pack. Initiated action to obtain tin plate and labor for emergent needs.	Submitted tin-plate requirements for essential items, such as tin-plate for cereal product processes.	Estimated requirements of essential items, such as tin-plate for canning surplus meat. Assisted industry in obtaining materials and facilities.	Submitted tin-plate requirements for industry. Maximum production of castor beans to be achieved in 1957, using strategic stockpile and other seed sources.	Recommended against goals program as post-attack supplies are estimated to be generally more than adequate.	Unfroze sugar for pharmaceutical manufacturers upon certification.		Priorities requested for emergency items for continued cigarette production, harvest of leaf tobacco, and increased naval stores production.
AGRICULTURAL MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS	Recommended incentive measures to insure diversion of 1957 acreage, since acreage allotments and marketing quotas would require considerable manpower.			Checking of acreage allotments & quotas to be limited to conserve manpower.					Tobacco compliance checks to be limited. Migratory labor must be moved into naval stores production area.
OTHER		Estimated credit needs for dairy processing facilities.	Furnished information re credit needs for fruit & vegetable facilities.	Developed information on credit needs for processing plants.	Establishment of War Heat Board recommended. Estimated credit needs of the industry.	Estimated industrial credit needs for rehabilitation and restoration of plants.	Determined that credit needs of industry could be met without assistance.	Maritime Commission asked re ocean shipping space for two million tons from Cuba, 400,000 tons from Puerto Rico, and 500,000 tons from Hawaii. Estimated credit needs of the industry.	







## SUMMARY OF SIMULATED PROGRAM ACTIONS BY U.S.D.A.


Attachment 6

## OPERATION ALERT 1956

## General Functional Areas

ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS	FOOD PRODUCTION	PRICE INCENTIVES	FOOD PROCESSING & DISTRIBUTION	NON-FOOD MATERIALS & SUPPLIES	HANPOWER	FOOD DISTRIBUTION	TRANSPORTATION AND WAREHOUSING	EXPORT-IMPORT CONTROL
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT	Evaluated damage assessment reports on CCC bin sites in bombed areas.		Evaluated reports on damage to packing facilities in various areas. Requested information on available facilities to which livestock could be diverted. Requested date on milk processing plants which could be used to handle milk normally processed in attack areas.	Evaluation of damage to farm machinery and equipment industry including damage to suppliers of components. Requested and received data on degree of destruction of farm buildings in attack areas.	Asked FCDA to advise farmers in fall-out area when they could leave shelters and resume activities.	Consolidated commodity data, analyzed data on remaining food stocks on Survival Items list, submitted estimates to ODM.	Requested ICC assess damage to transportation facilities and recommended food products have high priority on available transportation. Completed report on refrigerated warehouse bomb damage.	
SALVAGE & PROTECTION OF FOOD STOCKS	Arranged for salvage and reconditioning of CCC Grain authorizing use of eight drafts for this purpose.		Surveyed available packing plant capacity to salvage livestock that would have gone to damaged area. Made plans for financial aid and transportation of such livestock to alternate facilities.				Requested ICC modify order concerning sale on 72 hours' notice of perishables blocked in transit. Also, requested ICC notify USDA of blocked inland shipments of agricultural products destined for export.	
EVALUATION OF FOOD REQUIREMENTS & SUPPLIES	Cancelling of allotments and performance work at this time stopped the disposal of "excess" acreage of commodities which were already produced, and left them available for harvest. Soil Bank for 1956 was terminated and plans for the 1957 Soil Bank were cancelled.			Organized commodity Supply Estimates Committees.		As a basis for long range programs summarized data on evacuees by FCDA regions, as well as reported losses of wholesale food stocks and facilities. Comprehensive report on present and prospective food position submitted to Lowpoint and ODM.	Requested ICC report to USDA on all agricultural commodities regardless of emergency condition.	Requested Commerce and Navy to advise USDA of any actions recalling or diverting food cargoes at sea. Requested Treasury to advise USDA if any ships desiring to unload cargoes are inadmissible because of quantitative import controls.
FOOD ALLOCATIONS & DISTRIBUTION CONTROL						Developed freeze order on (1) processed foods at processor level, (2) imported food commodities down through wholesale level, and (3) all foodstocks in Northeast down through retailers with control & release delegated to FCDA. Anti-hoarding order developed.		Issued directive imposing embargo on all exports of foods and agricultural commodities, except to Canada. Prepared recommendation that import restrictions on peanuts be suspended, and surveyed need for similar action on other restricted commodities.
FOOD PROCUREMENT & SUPPLY					Delegated to Area Directors and State ASC committees certain standby action authority to be used when communications cut off.	Domestic and foreign donation programs stopped, commodities to be available to State and local CD offices for emergency feeding. Initiated a program to ship 5,000 cars of food per week into Northeast to provide basic foods for evacuees.		Advised ODM regarding availability of commodities for relief needs in certain countries.
FOOD & FIBER PRODUCTION	Requested inventory of seeds for vegetables, and other crops adaptable to areas adjacent to attack locations. Developed production goals procedures. Performance work on allotment crops, ACP, and Soil Bank was suspended. Acreage allotments on 1956 crops of cotton, soybeans, peanuts, and corn were suspended.			Developed program to assure adequate supply of cotton bale ties in order to save the crop which was already produced. Requested Interior for the procedure for securing supplies of petroleum products for farm use.	Initiated freeze orders for skilled agricultural and food processing personnel.			
NON-FOOD REQUIREMENTS & ALLOCATIONS				Distribution control order issued for farm machinery repairs and instructions sent to field offices. Recommendation made to Commerce that all crawler type tractor parts be placed under an allocation plan.			Advised ICC 100 percent exemption from control of milk and vegetable oil transportation needs required. Notified ICC concerning USDA interest in order placing tank carriers under control of ICC, setting forth impact on milk and oil food supplies for human diet.	
AGRICULTURAL HANPOWER					Field offices advised to cooperate with Selective Service and Employment Service in classifying registrants according to importance to agriculture. Also to advise these agencies on requirements for food, supply and crop situation and employment requirements for production of essentials. Provided for a pool of field personnel who could be used for emergency work, by advising counties to keep all personnel in assignment to other work.			
OTHER			Approval by FCDA of plans to reimburse farmers for expenses incurred in feeding and housing evacuees and refugees was requested.		Delegated to Area Directors and State ASC committees certain standby action authority to be used when communications cut off. State ASC offices were requested to furnish lists of employees of GS-7 and above giving their special qualifications.	Established USDA Councils to assist in the local administration of the Department's responsibilities.		







## SUMMARY OF SIMULATED PROGRAM ACTIONS BY U.S.D.A.

Attachment 7

## OPERATION ALERT 1956

## REGIONAL LIAISON REPRESENTATIVES AND PARTICIPATING U.S.D.A. AGENCIES

## -- Field Areas --

ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS	Area 1	Area 2	Area 3	Area 4	Area 5	Area 6	Area 7	Area 8
<del>FOOD DEFENSE</del>	Assessed damage to wholesale food stocks, CCC stocks of food and wool, and farm structures.	Assessed damage to electric power facilities, livestock and poultry industry, wholesale stocks, CCC stocks, farm structures.	Assessed damage to livestock and meat processing facilities, and to CCC stocks in the area.	Assessed damage to electrical facilities and Milwaukee grain elevators by on-the-spot check. Estimated square miles of farm land and the number of farms in each fallout zone.	Assessed damage to wholesale stocks, livestock and slaughtering and packing facilities, CCC inventories.	Assessed damage to livestock and slaughtering and meat packing facilities, wholesale stocks, CCC stocks, electric power facilities, farm structures, and feed in St. Paul and Minneapolis.	Arranged with Civil Defense for training of a corps of inspectors in radiological monitoring. Assessed damage to livestock and slaughtering and packing facilities, wholesale food stocks. Determined fallout damage to growing crops.	Assessed damage to livestock and meat packing facilities, wholesale stocks, CCC stocks, electric power, and cooler and freezer space.
<del>RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN FOOD STOCKS AND COMMODITIES</del>	Developed plan to rehabilitate farm structures. Took necessary action to salvage damaged wool by scouring operations.	Requested Regional Mobilization Committee to help to salvage CCC-owned dry milk and cheese. Developed plans to rehabilitate certain slaughtering facilities, dock and bridge structures and farm facilities.		Progress made in salvaging all meat and meat livestock at Chicago Yards.	Took action to protect CCC inventories. Took action to salvage damaged stocks and to dump stocks not salvageable following inspection (authority assumed due to break in communications).	Arranged to salvage as much CCC grain as possible.	Organized work crews for salvage of CCC stocks.	Warehouse engineers directed to carry out salvage operations in Spokane area.
<del>EVALUATION OF FOOD REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPLIES</del>	Assessed curtailment of New England milk supply and adequacy of supply remaining. Obtained and reported status of canned, dried and frozen fruits and vegetables in packers' hands. Provided data on status of wool stocks.	Reported to Reopoint status of various commercial stocks. Reported status of CCC inventory to Reopoint and Civil Defense. Determined feed needs of poultry industry. Determined and reported to Reopoint canned meat requirements.	Determined status of food supplies at bombed points and outside of those points. Determined available stocks of CCC commodities, and supplies of processed fruits and vegetables.	Computed port inventories New Orleans, Houston areas. Estimated CCC grain stocks and other inventory. Asked rail carriers to report cars of processed commodities. Estimated requirements for and supplies of food for New Mexico and one Texas point.	Reported salvageable and undamaged grain stocks to Reopoint. Reported other inventory data.	Reported commodities in short supply. Estimated stocks of fruits and vegetables in packers' hands.	Determined availability of CCC-owned warehouse stored commodities after attack. Estimated quantities of food by kind needed to feed evacuees 3 months and 6 months.	
<del>FOOD ADJUSTMENT AND DISTRIBUTION POLICY</del>	Initiated arrangements whereby Maritime Administration was instructed to transport grain in mothball fleet to Albany for unloading. Cancelled all delivery orders CCC wool.	Diverted dairy products on track.	Initiated appropriate action to terminate export payments on oranges and grapefruit.		Requested mills to stop shipments to bombed areas. Requested carriers to advise on equipment available to move and unload food.	Cancelled all loadings of CCC-owned grain.	All agencies handling USDA donated commodities ordered to stop regular distribution. Mobilized farm trucks for milk transport in California. Initiated action to terminate orange-grapefruit export payment.	Developed plans for unloading grain in mothball fleet at Olympia. Cancelled loading instructions on CCC-owned commodities.
<del>FOOD PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY</del>	Recommended against allowing Civil Defense in N.J. State to seize 10% of CCC-owned stocks unless authorized by USDA. Shipped emergency food to N.I., Conn., Vt., R.I., thus exhausting supplies in Area 1. Forwarded to Reopoint request for emergency food for N.J.	Procured certain food and feed commodities from commercial sources to alleviate distress areas. Obtained some food from Government stocks.	Arranged for shipment of cotton to New Jersey.	Made estimates of supplies of cheese and evaporated milk available for aid to Chicago. Arrangements made to ship 200,000 bushels of wheat and 50,000 bushels of corn to Minneapolis. Arrangements made to ship 5 cars of canned meat to Moline, Ill.	Requested transfer disbursing and collecting functions CCC from Dallas to shelter bank. Supplied food on request to distress areas.	Requested processed foodstuffs for guidance in supplying food to Nevada and Utah. Arranged with Area 8 for purchase of 2,000 tons of dried prunes for Chicago area.	Estimated dry prune supply and stocks of fruits and vegetables in hands of packers. Estimated dehydrated food supplies for shipment Anchorage, Alaska from Port of Everett, Wash.	
<del>FOOD AND FIBER POLICIES /</del>	Attempted to locate additional meat slaughtering capacity.	Provided alternate slaughtering and processing facilities. Suspended Soil Bank operation.	Recommended to national office that production of resin and turpentine be increased. Advised Reopoint of alternate slaughtering and processing facilities. Suspended Agricultural Conservation Program operation.		Suspended Soil Bank program.	Estimated emergency financial assistance needed in several states. Arranged for financial assistance to food processing plants. Stopped work on Agricultural Conservation and Soil Bank Programs.	Advised regarding program to obtain enough S-1 extra long staple cotton seed. Formulated plans for 32,000 acres castor bean plantings. Discontinued work on Agricultural Conservation Program and Soil Bank Program.	Estimated meat packing facilities available to make up for lost production. Reported available milk processing facilities. Planned to step up operation of feed-mixing plants.
<del>AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT AND APPARATUS</del>	Established control of replacement parts for farm machinery. Regional Mobilization Committee reported availability of Z-1 priority for rehabilitating essential food facilities. Planned action to conserve cotton bale ties at mills.	Established control of replacement parts for farm machinery. Procured equipment for livestock slaughtering. Requested Reopoint for help in obtaining tin for dry milk packaging. Requested help from other areas to obtain material to rehabilitate structures. Advised on availability of storage.	Reported number of cotton bale ties and buckles needed and extent of price violations on these items. Determined available supplies of linters pulp for manufacture of plastic and food packages. Reported location of livestock slaughtering facilities near bombed areas. Reported on electric power available to dairy farms. Requested that farm machinery needs be kept to a minimum. Determined status of petroleum supplies.	Reported on power facilities available for agricultural production and processing.		Attempted to obtain grain loading and drier equipment.	Action to relieve milk bottle and can shortage in California. Stocks of cotton ties and buckles low.	Advice to Reopoint on release of tin plate for cans.
<del>EMPLOYMENT SERVICE AND EMPLOYMENT</del>	Arranged for 500 farm workers from Puerto Rico to work on N.J. farms.	Made plans to furnish necessary farm manpower data to Selective Service and Employment Service.	Arranged for developing manpower needs for farm work. Worked out arrangements for employing and retaining necessary staff for Government work.				Arranged to assist Employment Service re manpower needs. Arranged to work with Selective Service on classification of registrants.	Discussed question of food processing manpower. Arranged to furnish farm manpower requirements to Selective Service and Employment Service.

1/ During Operation Alert 1956 Reopoint took simulated action to suspend the Soil Bank, discontinue acreage allotments and marketing quotas on all commodities except tobacco, and discontinue Agricultural Conservation Program operations. Some of the areas reported implementing actions; others did not, even though the action may have been taken.

## Notes:

In addition to direct action, effort was made in the areas to pass on important information. For example, the areas helped to inform those concerned of the simulated order placing restrictions on the transfer of new repair parts for farm machinery and equipment, which was issued by Reopoint.

In addition to the program actions indicated in the tabulation, there was a significant amount of administrative activity relating to activating the various alternate headquarters offices, implementing internal delegations of authority, determining availability of essential personnel, and establishing additional field coordinating and liaison groups.



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.....	Farm Property (FR54-6)
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.....	College Darmitories, Fraternities and Sororities (FR54-8)
.....	Food Canneries (FR54-9)
.....	Electric Generating Plants (FR55-1)
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**Quantity**

.....	Mataar Baats (FR55-3)
.....	Printing Plants (FR55-4)
.....	Restaurants (FR55-5)
.....	Oil Extraction Plants (FR55-6)
.....	Cattan Warehouses (FR55-7)
.....	Bakeries (FR55-8)
.....	Gasoline Service Stations (FR55-9)
.....	Motion Picture Theatres (FR56-1)
.....	One- and Twa-Family Dwellings (FR56-2)
.....	Furniture Factories (FR56-3)
.....	Churches (FR56-4)
.....	Retail Lumber Yards (FR56-5)

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